



THE “EASTERN MISCELLANY” INFORMS THE  
CHINESE PUBLIC

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By the early twentieth century the de facto partition of China was proceeding relentlessly as the major powers grabbed its land or laid claim to exclusive territorial spheres of influence. Britain was consolidating its base in Guangdong, the Yangzi River area, and Tibet. France took Guangxi, Yunnan, and Hainan, while Germany asserted control over Liaodong. Japan, already in occupation of Taiwan, was now intensifying its economic penetration of central China as well as its coastal regions. The United States took the advantage of the “open door” policy to compete with earlier comers. Under cover of the allied army’s invasion of Peking during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, Russia occupied the northeastern provinces (Manchuria), and then refused to withdraw. This caused the great “Ju E” (Resistance against Russia) protest movement in China, especially among students.<sup>1</sup>

The sense of crisis intensified when the Russo-Japanese War started *within* China, a theoretically sovereign state. Because of this as well as the surprising victory of Japan, the war shocked Chinese intellectuals. How was it possible for Japan, a small Asian country, to defeat Russia, a big European power? The answer to this question was vital if they were to understand how to go about strengthening their own obviously weakening nation. Through an analysis of *Dongfang*

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<sup>1</sup> This explained why, when the Russo-Japanese War started, most of the Chinese stood on the side of Japan. One of the communist pioneers, Wu Yuzhang, described his experience of the Ju-E movement while in Japan as a student, recalling in his memoirs that “the movement was going on for a long time. After the Russo-Japanese War started in February 1904, people sympathized with Japan because of their hatred towards Tsarist Russia. When they heard of the Japanese victories, they were very happy. How naïve and ridiculous from today’s viewpoint! Both were imperialists and both enemies that invaded China.” Wu Yuzhang, *Xinhai Geming* [The 1911 Revolution] (Beijing, 1969), 55–59.

*Zazhi* (The Eastern Miscellany), a highly influential journal of international affairs at the time,<sup>2</sup> this paper assesses the impact of the Russo-Japanese War on Chinese nationalism, a subject heretofore neglected by Chinese and Western scholarship.<sup>3</sup> It will argue that Chinese nationalism of a new type emerged in this period, directly related to the war and the consequent ambivalence that developed toward Japan, China's once weak and now strong neighbor.

#### *Coverage of the War*

*The Eastern Miscellany* was published by Shangwu Yingshu Guang (The Commercial Press) and was the most-read journal of international affairs in China in the early twentieth century. Founded by seven Chinese Christians in 1897, the Commercial Press played a very important role in the introduction of Western ideas to China through the publication of periodicals and books, including many translations of European works. Among their various journals, the most prominent was *The Eastern Miscellany*, which was first issued in 1904 and ceased publication in 1948—its forty-five-year uninterrupted

<sup>2</sup> The materials used in this paper are mainly from the first three volumes of the journal (1904–1906), but it was published until 1948. In 1910 it became the largest journal in the country with a circulation of 15,000. Aside from editorials written by the journal's staff, many important articles from other papers were also reprinted therein, making it an important source for contemporary intellectual trends in general.

<sup>3</sup> Few of the recent studies on Chinese nationalism touch on this subject. See Tang Wenquan, *Juexing yu Mian: Zhongguo Jindai Minzu Zhuyi Sixiao Yanjiu* [A Study of the Ideology of Nationalism in Modern China], (Shanghai, 1993); Tao Shu, *Wan Qing Minzu Zhuyi Sixiao* [The Ideology of Nationalism in the Late Qing Era] (Beijing, 1995); Luo Fuhui, ed., *Zhongguo Minzu Zhuyi Sixiang Lungao* [A Tentative Study of the Ideology of Chinese Nationalism], (Wuhan, 1996); Wang Lixin, *Meiguo Dui Hua Zhengce yu Zhongguo Minzu Zhuyi Yundong (1904–1928)* [American China Policy and Chinese Nationalism] (Beijing, 2000); Luo Zhitian, *Luan Shi Qian Liu: Minzu Zhuyi yu Minguo Zhengzhi* [Nationalism and Politics in the Republic Period] (Shanghai, 2001); Yang Sixing, *Wenhua Minzu Zhiyi yu Jindai Zhongguo* [Cultural Nationalism and Modern China] (Beijing, 2003). Jonathan Spence, a guru of modern Chinese history, discusses Chinese nationalism of the period, but fails to mention the significant role of the war in his classic *In Search of Modern China* (New York, 1999), 229–36. Similarly with John E. Schrecker, *Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism: Germany in Shantung* (Cambridge, MA, 1971). Germaine Hoston, *State, Identity, and the National Question in China and Japan* (Princeton, 1994), is an exception in treating the impact of the war on Chinese nationalism.

run making it an unusual phenomenon in the history of the modern Chinese press.<sup>4</sup>

The journal was modeled after the British *Review of Reviews* and the Japanese *Sun*. The aim was clearly stated in the first issue: "the guiding principle of the journal is to enlighten the Chinese people and to establish [intellectual] contact with East Asia."<sup>5</sup> Each issue included editorials and book reviews and covered news of imperial decrees, domestic affairs, warfare and diplomacy, education, finance, business, transportation, religion, and public lectures. Its audience was made up mainly of intellectuals, and the political orientation changed over time. But during and immediately after the Russo-Japanese War, it advocated a constitutional monarchy, which corresponded to the views of the majority of the population.

Coincidentally, *The Eastern Miscellany* and Russo-Japanese War both began in the same year. The journal was launched on March 11, 1904, one month after the start of the conflict, and from then on it kept a close watch on all aspects of the war. Various photographs appeared on the front pages of each issue, including those of important political and military figures, war scenes, and military uniforms. Images of Emperor Meiji Tennō and Czar Nicholas II appeared in the first issue<sup>7</sup> and numerous other individuals thereafter. All told from the first issue of March 11, 1904 through the eighth issue of the second year (September 23, 1905), there appeared thirty-nine photographs of Japanese figures and fourteen of Russians. Among the former were Minister of Defense General Nogi, General Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, Admiral Uriu, Admiral Togo, and captains of Japanese battleships.<sup>6</sup> Among the Russians were Empress Alexandra and the

<sup>4</sup> Next to this, the most successful periodicals of the Commercial Press were *Jiaoyu Zazhi* (The Educational Review, 1909–1948), *Xiaoshuo Yuebao* (Novel Monthly, 1910–1932), and *Xuesheng Zazhi* (The Student's Magazine, 1914–1947. The Chinese name of the magazine was changed in 1920 while its English name remained the same, and the magazine was interrupted twice, in 1931–37 and 1941–43). It also published a series of Chinese and Western classics, and became the largest publisher in China in the Republic period. See *Shangwu Yinshu Guang Yi Bai Nian, 1897–1997* [Centenary of the Commercial Press] (Beijing, 1998).

<sup>5</sup> *Dongfang Zazhi, Sheshuo*, 1:1 (1904), 1. At the end of 1903, the founder of the press, Xia Ruifang, proposed the journal. First named *Dong Ya Zazhi* [East Asia Journal], the title was soon changed to *Dongfang Zazhi* [Eastern Miscellany] to avoid repetition of the name of a journal run by the German Council in Shanghai. Chen Jianmin, *Zhi Min zhi Meng: Zhang Yuanji Zhuan* [The Dream of Enlightening the People: A Biography of Zhang Yuanji] (Chengdu, 1995), 123.

<sup>6</sup> For photographs of eight Japanese captains appearing in one issue, see *Dongfang Zazhi*, 2:7 (1905).

main military commanders: Kuropatkin, Makarov, Stoessel, Linevich, Rozhestvenskii, etc. Illustrations of warfare were also routinely featured, for example the battles of Jingzhou and the Japanese Sea; in the case of the latter, drawings showed Japanese soldiers launching a torpedo against Russian ships. Also depicted were wrecked Russian ships, the retreat of Russian troops from Jiulian to the city of Fenghuang (Phoenix), the Japanese attack on Fushun, and a Japanese officer visiting captured Russian officers in the hospital. One illustration featured a Russian and a Japanese officer falling into the water in the midst of hand-to-hand combat!

Along with images of war, the journal devoted a special section of each issue to a "Summary of Russo-Japanese Military Affairs." The first one discussed the declaration of war, the Korean battlefields, Russian defensive measures, the number of Russian soldiers in Lüxhun, Japanese defenses, and the neutrality of China, among other related matters. Military engagements were subsequently covered in great detail, for instance in the seventh issue the battles of Gaiping, Xihezhi, Dashiqiao, Ximucheng, and Lüxhun (Port Arthur).<sup>7</sup> There were reports and analyses of every other imaginable aspect of the war, from newly appointed officers to troop maneuvers, from the diplomacy of the great powers to Russian and Japanese defense finance, from the rising power of "yellow Asia" to the tragic death of 600 Russian sailors aboard the battleship "Petropavlovsk" after it had been struck by a mine.<sup>8</sup>

The extensive and visual coverage of the war in this journal read so avidly by the educated segments of society ensured that it would be uppermost in their thoughts. The stimulation of nationalist sentiments in China that resulted provides an example of the crucial role of the mass media in the development of modern intellectual movements around the world.

### *Shame and Blame*

China's image changed over time. The Western perception of Chinese civilization had gone from sheer admiration to contemptuousness.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> *Dongfang Zazhi*, 1:7 (1904), 292-96.

<sup>8</sup> "On the Change of the Russo-Japanese War Situation after the Death of Makarov," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Junshi (Military), 1:3 (1904), 137-40.

<sup>9</sup> See Raymond Dawson, *The Chinese Chameleon: An Analysis of European Conceptions*

Up to the beginning of the twentieth century, China had lost elements of its sovereignty in a number of wars with imperialist powers. For Chinese intellectuals the Russo-Japanese War was a typical example of this predicament: this war, fought in China to decide which power would end up occupying it, was an unforgettable humiliation for the entire populace. Of course, the situation was nothing new. Even before the war, the Russians and Japanese maneuvered to gain the advantage over each other in China.<sup>10</sup> After Russian troops occupied the northeast in 1900, the tsarist government came under pressure from the Japanese and their new British allies to withdraw by late 1903.<sup>11</sup> However, despite its promises and treaty obligations, the Russian government showed no intention of following through.<sup>12</sup>

But the war itself imposed overt suffering on the Chinese people, despite their government's neutrality in the conflict, as Russia and Japan decided to settle their differences in China without consulting the "host" nation.<sup>13</sup> To add insult to injury both Russian and Japanese troops put pressure on local officials and the populace to support their war efforts. For example, Russian officers once threatened to punish the people of Haicheng if they refused to provide carts for Russian troops.<sup>14</sup> They disregarded their treaty obligations, ordered local Chinese administrators around, and even killed Chinese citizens.<sup>15</sup>

*of Chinese Civilization* (London, 1967), especially 90–154. Also see Upton Close (Josef Washington Hall), *The Revolt of Asia: The End of the White Man's World Dominance* (New York, 1927).

<sup>10</sup> John Albert White, *The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War* (Princeton, 1964), 11–49, 76–94. See also Guan Xunxia & Wan Anzhong, "A Tentative Study of the Rivalry of Russia and Japan in China before the Russo-Japanese War," *Shi Xue Yue Kan* [Historical Studies Monthly], no. 3 (1994), 99–104.

<sup>11</sup> Huang Yuebo, Yu Nengmo & Bao Liren, eds., *Zhong Wai Tiaoyue Huibian* [A Collection of Treaties between China and Foreign Countries], (Shanghai, 1935), 354–55.

<sup>12</sup> See White, *Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War*, 50–75, and Igor Lukoianov, "The Bezobrazovtsy," in *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective*, ed. John W. Steinberg et al. (Leiden, 2005), 65–86.

<sup>13</sup> "The leaders of both nations might well have pondered the circumstance that not all the wars which the West had fought with China had wrung from her an acceptance of equality. Yet up to the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the anxious counsels of the few statesmen in both countries who did not see these things fell on deaf ears." Ernest Batson Price, *The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907–1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia* (Baltimore, 1933), 17.

<sup>14</sup> Liaoling Provincial Archives, ed., *Ri E Zhangzheng Dang-an Shiliao* [Archival Historical Data of the Russo-Japanese War] (Liaoling, 1995), document 86, p. 141.

<sup>15</sup> Cu Qing, "The Government must not give up," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 1:3 (1904), 41–44.

The Japanese, for their part, treated China as if it were their own nation, seeking to collect import-export duties at the railroad station in Yingkou, training Chinese militia to fight side by side with them against the Russians, and arresting and torturing Chinese local officials.<sup>16</sup> Both Russia and Japan pressured China to take their side against the other.<sup>17</sup>

All this outraged the Chinese intelligentsia and inflamed their nationalist passions. Qiu Jin, a famous female revolutionary, wrote an explicitly nationalistic poem in 1905, in which she expressed anger at the unjust war that “sacrificed the blood of a hundred of thousand heads in order to change the world.”<sup>18</sup> Liu Yazhi, another prominent social activist, also condemned the war and expressed a strong patriotism in a poem of his own.<sup>19</sup> Zhou En-lai, the future premier of the People’s Republic of China, learned his first lesson of patriotism at the battlefields of the Russo-Japanese War, where innocent Chinese suffered greatly at the hands of foreign soldiers.<sup>20</sup>

That this was a national tragedy was without question. But who was to blame—Chinese emperor or corrupt officials, the autocratic political system or the obsolescence of China’s historical legacy, the Chinese people or foreign powers?<sup>21</sup> And even more pressing was the question of what China should do in order to regain its lost face and national strength.

<sup>16</sup> See the special section “Damages on the Chinese Side,” in Liaoning Provincial Archives, ed., *Ri E Zhangzheng Dang-an Shiliao*, documents 150–272 (especially 85, 112, 113, 117), pp. 289–470.

<sup>17</sup> “On the Chinese Situation,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 1:3 (1904), 47–50.

<sup>18</sup> Qiu Jin, “To Inscribe *Jiangshan Wanli Tu* and to Answer a Japanese Request for My Poem,” in Qiu Jin, *Qiu jin Quan Ji Jianzhu* [Notes and Commentary on the Complete Works of Qiu jin], ed. Guo Changhai and Guo Junxi (Changchun, 2003), 171–172.

<sup>19</sup> Liu Yazhi, “To Inscribe *Zhang Changshui Collection*,” in *Liu Yazhi Shi Xuan* [Selected Poems by Liu Yazhi], ed. Xu Wenlie, with commentary by Liu Sihan (Guangzhou, 1981), 8–9.

<sup>20</sup> Chae-Jin-Lee, *Zhou Enlai: The Early Years* (Stanford, 1994), 26, 27.

<sup>21</sup> It would be simplistic to presume that the contemporary Chinese only blamed the Qing dynasty for the depressive situation. “Western analysts, then and now, have debated how seriously imperialism actually disrupted the Chinese economy and social system. There can be no debate, however, on how acutely Chinese of all classes felt the foreign threat and blamed the reigning Qing (Manchu) dynasty for its failure to meet it.” William G. Rosenberg and Marilyn B. Young, *Transforming Russia and China: Revolutionary Struggle in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1982), 74.

Some attributed China's weaknesses to the slow development of patriotic feeling. Since the mid-1800s, China had made concessions and suffered failure whenever it dealt with foreign countries. Why? "Though government officials should be blamed, another reason is that Chinese nationalism was not fully developed."<sup>22</sup> "Having realized that its treasury is in deficit, its armed forces vulnerable, its diplomacy failing, the autocratic court is ready to give up anything in order to keep its title and position. The court officials have no patriotic sentiment, and the common people know nothing about national affairs (if living under a constitutional state, they would surely think of the way to self-salvation). Therefore China is divided, and foreign powers plan to bolster their armed forces so that they will not lag behind their rivals in the partition of China."<sup>23</sup> In the view of *The Eastern Miscellany*, it was thus impossible for the isolated Qing government, without the support of a Chinese nationalist movement, to confront foreign countries, in whose lands nationalism was fully developed, inspirational, and mobilized to the full by governments. The war, however, was seen as a turning point and an opportunity for the Chinese to stand up, to "guard our territory and strengthen our race."<sup>24</sup>

*"Huang Zhong Jiang Xing" (The Yellow Race Will Rise)*<sup>25</sup>

The war also shattered the myth of the superiority of the white race and held out hopes that the yellow race would one day be restored as master of the East.<sup>26</sup>

"Universe," "Middle Kingdom" and the "people under the heaven" were the age-old self-perceptions of the Chinese. Now other nations had risen and the Chinese began to realize the bitter fact that they were not at the center of the universe and that other nations held

<sup>22</sup> "On the Applicability of Chinese Morale," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 2:9 (1905), 183-84.

<sup>23</sup> "On the Yellow Peril," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 1:2 (1904), 35.

<sup>24</sup> Zhong You, "On the Applicability of Chinese Morale," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 1:1 (1904), 5.

<sup>25</sup> From the title "Congratulations, the Yellow Race Will Rise," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 1:1 (1904), 15.

<sup>26</sup> Xian Xiansheng, "On the Seriousness of China's Responsibility," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 1:1 (1904), 3-5.



them in contempt as one of the backward “yellow race.” Given the hierarchy of races in the contemporary European worldview<sup>27</sup> plenty of justification existed for the white colonization of Asia.<sup>28</sup>

But in China as elsewhere in the non-Western world the Russo-Japanese War dealt a blow to European racist theory,<sup>29</sup> which would have predicted the victory of the white power in a major military conflict such as this one. “Since the five continents started communication, the white race has been bullying the world, e.g. the red, the black, and the brown races, and the yellow race was nibbled at by the white as well . . . . Yet in the Russo-Japanese War, Russia, with a size advantage of forty times the territory and three times the population . . . was beaten by small Japan. The old theory of race no longer holds water. We yellow people can defend ourselves and stand up with pride.”<sup>30</sup> Russia’s defeat at the hands of Japan greatly encouraged Chinese intellectuals, who saw in it a means of persuading their disheartened fellow countrymen that China would rise again in the future—if only it learned the proper lessons from their racial brethren the Japanese. This strategy was evident from the very first issue of *The Eastern Miscellany*, whose “Sheshuo,” or editorial, column in nearly every article reversed the previously normal usage of the term “yellow race”: once derogatory, it was now applied with pride to describe the victorious Japanese and, in their company, the Chinese people.<sup>31</sup> And its articles attacked Western fears of the “yellow peril” as emanations of white prejudice.<sup>32</sup>

Beginning with the pivotal battle of Lüxhun, which was regarded as “the first instance of the white race being humiliated by the yellow

<sup>27</sup> On which see, for example, P. Bowler, *The Invention of Progress*, Oxford, 1989; M. Bernal, *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classic Civilization*, vol. 1 (London, 1987); J. M. Blaut, “The Theory of Cultural Racism,” *Antipode*, 24:4 (1992), 289–99.

<sup>28</sup> See J. M. Blaut, *The Colonizer’s Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History* (Guilford Press, 1993), chap. 2 and *passim*.

<sup>29</sup> Steven G. Marks, “Bravo, Brave Tiger of the East! The War and the Rise of Nationalism in British Egypt and India,” in *Russo-Japanese War*, ed., Steinberg, 609–628.

<sup>30</sup> Zhong You, “On the Applicability of Chinese Morale,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 1:1 (1904), 5.

<sup>31</sup> See, for example, “Congratulations: the Yellow Race Will Rise,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 1:1 (1904); “The Competition between the Yellow Race and the White Race in History,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 3:13 (1907).

<sup>32</sup> “On the Yellow Peril,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 1:2 (1904); “An Argument against the Yellow Peril Theory,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 2:2 (1905).

race,"<sup>33</sup> the war was seen as a struggle between Asia and Europe, the yellow and white races, autocracy (Russia) and constitutionalism (Japan). Which was better, which was stronger, which was doomed and which destined to glory? These were the questions whose answers were obvious in light of the war's outcome. "We surely would not state that we prefer the victory of Europe and the failure of Asia, the growth of the white race and the decline of the yellow race, the success of the autocratic political system that has exploited us and the failure of the constitutional political system that favors us."<sup>34</sup> Thanks to Japan the Chinese nation could see clearly that its suffering and humiliation were not due to their race but to the oppressions of an autocratic power. Only with that realization might China take the steps necessary to once again become masters in their own realm.<sup>35</sup>

As evidenced by these writings, Chinese intellectuals were conflating "race" and "nation." The logic of this thinking was as follows: the war proved that white racist theories were invalid. If the Japanese could be strong so could the Chinese as members of the same race; if Japan as a nation could rise to greatness so could China. The publishers of *The Eastern Miscellany* were not merely expressing thrill at the successes of a fellow Asian nation, but seeking nothing less than the renovation of their country. And they were enunciating a strategy with which to realize this cherished dream: mobilize the nationalist impulses of the masses by harping on the existence of racial enemies. This strategy was not new to China, but was a common feature of political power in the twentieth century. European imperialists justified their colonizing activities through racial theory; Adolf Hitler stoked racial animosities to secure power in Germany and launch World War II; Japanese nationalism utilized derogatory perceptions of the "Chinaman" (Zhina Ren); Afrikaaner nationalist ideology in South Africa rested on views of the inferiority of blacks.

<sup>33</sup> "On the Yellow Peril," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 1:2 (1904), 34-36.

<sup>34</sup> Bieshi, "On the Relation of the Sino-Japanese Division and Unity," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 1:1 (1904), 1-3. The article recalled the history of the Japan's resistance against the invasion of the Yuan (the Mongols) and praised the Japanese for protecting their cultural heritage. The author argued that the fight against the Russians was the result of continuity and "past resistance against the Yuan."

<sup>35</sup> "On the Perceptible Opportunity of China's Promising Future," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 1:3 (1904), 53-56.

Not only the oppressors adopted the strategy, but so did their opponents, for instance the leaders of African anti-colonial struggles: the Zulu thinker Anton Muziwakhe Lembede tried to use Africanism to unite the blacks in South Africa behind the nationalist movement.<sup>36</sup> Leopold Sedar Senghor touted “black beauty” or “Negritude” to inspire his people.<sup>37</sup> Kwame Nkrumah formulated a Pan-African ideology for the same purpose.<sup>38</sup> What developed among the Chinese intelligentsia leadership was a similar but earlier phenomenon. And although the meaning of the expression “yellow race” was obscure, yet the people and the intelligentsia alike latched onto it, for it gave the Chinese a sense of hope and self-esteem in a world where the strong seemed to be swallowing the weak.

“*Junzi Gui Minqi*” (*Gentlemen Cherish the People’s Morale*)<sup>39</sup>

In accord with this embryonic nationalist strategy, one of the important issues discussed in *The Eastern Miscellany* was the popular morale,<sup>40</sup> which it felt should be encouraged, inspired, and strengthened so as to “guard our territory and expand our race.”<sup>41</sup> What they meant by this term was never accurately defined, but according to Liang Qichao, one of the leading reformists at the time, only when “national pride” and the “people’s rights” are non-violable can we speak of “the people’s morale,”<sup>42</sup> which understanding suggests the links the

<sup>36</sup> A. M. Lembede, “Some Basic Principles of African Nationalism,” in T. G. Karis & G. M. Carter, eds., *From Protest to Challenge* (Stanford, 1973), 314–316, 317–318.

<sup>37</sup> Leopold Sedar Senghor, *Negritude et humanisme* (Paris, 1964).

<sup>38</sup> Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (London, 1963) and *Revolutionary Path* (London, 1973).

<sup>39</sup> “On the Relations between the People’s Morale and the State,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 2:6 (1905), 122.

<sup>40</sup> See for example, “On the Applicability of Chinese Morale,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 1:1(1904); “On Raising the People’s Morale,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 2:3 (1905); “On the Relations between the People’s Morale and the State,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 2:6 (1905); “On the Cause of the Decline of Chinese Morale,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 2:8 (1905); “On the applicability of Chinese Morale,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 2:9 (1905); “On the Relations between People’s Morale and Diplomacy,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Waijiao (Diplomacy), 3:1 (1906); “On the People’s Morale,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 3:4 (1906).

<sup>41</sup> Zhong You, “On the Applicability of Chinese Morale,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 1:1(1904), 7.

<sup>42</sup> Liang Qichao, “On the People’s Morale,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 3:4 (1906), 75.

journal saw between constitutionalism, anti-imperialism, and nationalism. In its view, the people's morale determined the condition of the nation: "if the people's morale is strong, the nation is strong. When it is said the state is not to be insulted, it is in reality not the state but the people's morale that is not to be insulted; when it is said the state is not to be destroyed, it is the people's morale that is not to be destroyed. To base the state on the soldiers, the state would perish when the soldiers are finished; to base the state on wealth, the state would perish when the wealth is used up; to base the state on territory, the state would perish when the territory is taken away. But if the state were based on the people's morale, the state would not perish even if there is but one person left."<sup>43</sup>

The author of this statement takes it to an extreme, but it nonetheless reveals how important morale among the masses was to Chinese intellectuals: it was for them the very essence of the strong nation. "The American people's strong morale is represented by Washington, the French people's strong morale by Napoleon, the British people's strong morale by Victoria, the German people's strong morale by Wilhelm, the Japanese people's strong morale by Meiji." When Japan was fighting with Russia, "the whole nation united as one," "the people only know the nation, without consideration of individuals." Family members saw their menfolk off to the battlefield *with enjoyment*, and "every father, son, husband, and son-in-law was determined to die in battle in order to express his gratitude for the blessings of his nation."<sup>44</sup> That was the key to Japanese victory, and it was a quality that was lacking in China.

The journal's authors made it clear that the popular morale depended above all on military might, arms, wealth, and education. When the "people have arms, foreigners do not dare humiliate them. When the people are prosperous, it is easy for business to thrive. With education, people come to know and love their country."<sup>45</sup> Moreover, this morale of the masses is contingent on the wisdom and virtue of the people, and freedom from governmental abuse—which Liang Qichao took great pains to criticize.<sup>46</sup> While these themes

<sup>43</sup> "On the Relations between People's Morale and the State," *Dongfang Zazhi*, *Sheshuo*, 2:6 (1905), 121–23.

<sup>44</sup> "On Raising the People's Morale," *Dongfang Zazhi*, *Sheshuo*, 2:3 (1905), 56–59.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> Liang Qichao, "On the People's Morale," *Dongfang Zazhi*, *Sheshuo*, 3:4 (1906),

are redolent of the European Romantic idealization of the folk, this was not a bunch of dreamy utopians airing their ideological fantasies. They believed that in very concrete and pragmatic ways the people's morale, properly mobilized, could benefit the nation's international standing. This was already in evidence with the "rights recovery movement" and the boycott of American goods, both instances in which the government was backed by popular opinion and brought it to bear in negotiations with foreign governments, for example with the United States over Yue-Han railroad rights.<sup>47</sup>

In the minds of these authors, nationalism was intertwined with and sometimes synonymous with the concept of popular morale. In an article entitled "The Application of the People's Morale in China," Chinese nationalism was the theme, and the word "nationalism" appeared ten times, while the expression "people's morale" did not appear except in the title. Nationalism was regarded as the vital force driving human history since the sixteenth century. "Expansion, colonization, and export to other countries all sustained imperialism and all originated in nationalism."<sup>48</sup> Now it was developing in China too, and according to *The Eastern Miscellany*, it passed through three stages: collective, provincial, and national. In the first stage, the fight was against a foreign power by an organization or organizations within one locale or region alone.<sup>49</sup> The second stage involved the struggle of several provinces over a single issue.<sup>50</sup> The economic boy-

75–83. The article was first published in *Xinmin Congbao* and reprinted by *Dongfang Zazhi*.

<sup>47</sup> For recent studies, see Wang Lixin, *Meiguo Dui Hua Zhengce yu Zhongguo Minzu Zhuyi Yundong*; Wong Sin Kiong, *The Anti-American Protest in Chinese Communities Overseas: History and Documents* (Singapore, 2001); Wong Sin Kiong, *China's Anti-American Boycott Movement in 1905* (New York, 2002). More significant in "wakening up" Chinese nationalism, the American abuse of the Chinese delegation invited to the St. Louis Exposition in 1904 and its exclusionary policies toward Chinese residents of Hawaii and the Philippines greatly angered the Chinese at the time. The Russo-Japanese War, the British attack on Tibet, and America's discriminatory policy toward the Chinese were considered three big challenges the Chinese government had to face. See Cu Qing, "The Government Must not Give up," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 1:3 (1904), 41.

<sup>48</sup> "On the Applicability of the People's Morale in China," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 3:9 (1906), 183–85.

<sup>49</sup> The best example is the struggle against foreigners by Si Ming Gong Shuo in Shanghai, an organization of the Ninbo people. Conflicts occurred twice between that organization and the French in 1874 and 1898. See Yu Hongxin, "A Centenary of the Huihai Road," *Shanghai Tan* (Shanghai Talk), no. 10, 2000.

<sup>50</sup> The Chinese fight for Yue-Han railroad rights was a symbol of this stage,

cott against the Americans was the symbol of the third stage, which involved Chinese from all walks of life.<sup>51</sup> Whether or not the division of nationalism into these three stages was accurate is not relevant: what is important is that the journal and many Chinese came to see it as a movement with a nation-wide base, deep roots at all levels of society, and capable of effecting the resurrection of China as a truly sovereign nation.

*Self-reflection and Mixed Feelings*

The Japanese victory over the Russians sent shockwaves running through every level of Chinese society. The intelligentsia sought to comprehend and take charge of the surge of patriotism and nationalist demands that followed—hence *The Eastern Miscellany's* treatment of popular morale. The largest part of its reflections on the war, however, concerned Japan as a neighbor to admire and emulate, but also warily keep at arm's length.

The journal started with the assumption that although China for historic and geographical reasons should not be inferior to Japan, it now was. Japan had defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and followed that up with another stunning victory over a great European power. Chinese intellectuals were desperate to alter this woeful state of affairs and so urged their countrymen to adopt the Japanese model in politics, education, and the military. This became known as the "Japanning process,"<sup>52</sup> which Chinese nationalists considered the means of achieving "Qiang Guo Meng," or the "dream of strengthening the nation."

One major conclusion drawn from the Russo-Japanese War was that the constitutional system of Japan was superior to the autocratic

which involved three provinces, Hubei, Hunan, and Guangdong. See "To Borrow National Debt in Order to Promote Railroads and the Mining Industry," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Shiping (Review), 1:5 (1904); "On the Yue-Han Railway," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Jiaotong (Transportation), 1:5 (1904); "The Yue-Han Railway has Become a Diplomatic Affair," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Shiping, 1:7 (1904); "On the Transfer of the Yue-Han Railway Rights," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Jiaotong, 1:10 (1904). See also Wang Lixin, *Meiguo Dui Hua Zhengce yu Zhongguo Minzu Zhuyi Yundong*, 27–57.

<sup>51</sup> See Wang Lixin, *Meiguo Dui Hua Zhengce yu Zhongguo Minzu Zhuyi Yundong*, 58–176.

<sup>52</sup> W. A. P. Martin, *The Awakening of China* (New York, 1910), 194.

forms of government prevalent in Russia and China. Late Qing scholars greatly favored a constitutional monarchy, and *The Eastern Miscellany* provided a platform for this viewpoint. Among 327 articles published in the first seven volumes (1904–1910) on various topics, thirty-six specifically advocated this form of political arrangement.<sup>53</sup> The Qing government had actually adopted a series of political reforms since 1901, but introduction of a constitutional system began only after the Russo-Japanese War. To most of the reform-minded Chinese, the war offered decisive proof of the benefits of constitutionalism.<sup>54</sup> Previously it had been the conventional wisdom that Russia was strong because it was ruled by an autocracy. Now, thanks to Russia's military defeat, a whole new political logic emerged, which went as follows: in the West, land belonged to the people, who were the masters of their country and were served by government officials and leaders, including even monarchs. Governments such as these could not refuse to carry out the wishes of the populace. In China, the opposite was the case. The emperor was the master of the country, the land was his property, and the officials were his servants. The people were equal to slaves who were excluded from the halls of government. Officialdom served the emperor rather than the people, who had no role in the running of their society and were kept ignorant of the affairs of the nation. As a result, their attitude toward their own country was one of total apathy. It was of no concern to them whether the emperor died or whether the state was destroyed.<sup>55</sup> Making a contribution to the nation did not even enter their minds.<sup>56</sup> People would become patriotic and strive to contribute to the society at large only after they were granted the right to participate in politics.

In this debate over the political system, the pro-constitutional school's emphasis on "min quan," or the people's rights, was influenced by the European Enlightenment.<sup>57</sup> But it is noteworthy that Chinese

<sup>53</sup> Fang Hanqi, *Zhongguo Jindai Baokan Shi* [A Modern History of Chinese Newspapers and Journals] (Taiyuan, 1981), 297.

<sup>54</sup> "On the Japanese Victory as the Sign of Constitutionalism," *Dongfang Zazhi*, *Sheshuo*, 2:6 (1905), 115–17.

<sup>55</sup> "China Must Change its Politics before Reform," *Dongfang Zazhi*, *Sheshuo*, 1:1 (1904), pp. 10–13.

<sup>56</sup> Zhong You, "On the Applicability of Chinese Morale," *Dongfang Zazhi*, *Sheshuo*, 1:1 (1904), 4–5.

<sup>57</sup> "On the Emphasis on People's Right," *Dongfang Zazhi*, *Sheshuo*, 2:5 (1905), 94–95.

students absorbed many of these ideas while studying in Japan and then took an active part in advocating and organizing on behalf of a constitutional monarchy.<sup>58</sup> The nation-wide pressure for such a regime became so great that the Dowager Empress had to appoint two missions to investigate constitutionalism abroad in 1905.<sup>59</sup> One of the conclusions of these official missions was that people would be more concerned about the nation and more willing to serve its needs when they were allowed to participate in political affairs.<sup>60</sup> Accordingly, on September 1, 1906, the Qing government issued an edict that stated the following: "now the time has arrived for us to consider, observe, and put into effect constitutional government. Supreme power will be retained by the court, but the various affairs of governance will be handled together with public opinion. Thus the state will establish a moral foundation to last for ten thousand years."<sup>61</sup> But the Qing court feared losing its power and was not ready to relinquish any of it, as the edict makes clear. Consequently, the Qing regime survived only another four years.

Education was another major aspect of the Japanning process Chinese intellectuals hoped to undertake in their country. Education was a key component of Chinese cultural life for centuries, but it was now apparent that the most needed was modern education of the sort taught in Japan. After 1894 the Qing government sped up educational reform by issuing the New Principle of the School and sending promising young students to study abroad. Now the Russo-Japanese War provided another stimulus for learning about the Japanese educational system. Nearly every analysis of the Japanese victory emphasized the role of education. "How did Japan win its

<sup>58</sup> Zhang Xueji, "On the Role Played by the Chinese Students in Japan in the Constitutional Movement of the Late Qing Era," in *Xinhai Geming Xin Lun* [New Treatises on the 1911 Revolution], ed. Liu Yangyang (Changsha, 1996), 162–86.

<sup>59</sup> One of the missions was originally supposed to start its journey in summer but was delayed by a bomb explosion which slightly injured two members. The mission finally set off in December 1905.

<sup>60</sup> "Document 52: A Report on Constitutional Governments Abroad, 1906," in *China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839–1923*, ed. Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, MA, 1979), 208–209. For details of the mission's activities, see Dai Hengci, *Chi Shi Jiu Guo Rijì* [Diary of the Mission to Nine Countries] (Changsha, 1986).

<sup>61</sup> Ming-Qing Archives Department of the Palace Museum, ed., *Qingmo Choubei Li Xian Dang-an Shiliao* [Archival Materials on Constitutional Preparations in the Late Qing Era], vol. 1 (Beijing, 1979), 441.



hegemony? If we explained this as a result of the advantages of its finance and the strength of its arms, we would be wrong. Japan achieved its success due to its stress on education, [which taught] . . . the patriotic duty of dying in battle for the sake of historic honor, patriotism, and safeguarding of the nation.”<sup>62</sup>

From 1904 on, China learned about the Japanese educational system in three ways. First, the government sent officials to Japan either for training and educational purposes. In 1905, more than 300 officials were sent to Japan to study law and politics.<sup>63</sup> Second, the Qing court imported a host of Japanese instructors, the earliest in the military sphere to assist in the modernization of the army and navy, but other Japanese professors were engaged by public and private institutions to introduce educational reform. “Even in agriculture, on which they have hitherto prided themselves, the Chinese have put themselves under the teaching of the Japanese, while with good reason they have taken them as teachers in forestry also.” Many Japanese in every handicraft specialty were also employed in China.<sup>64</sup> Third, according to Japanese scholar Saneto Keishu, “1904, the year of the Russo-Japanese War, witnessed a great increase in the number of Chinese students in Japan.”<sup>65</sup> If not sponsored by the court or provincial governments, they went at their own expense, and the number increased yearly between 1904 and 1908 from 1,300 to more than 15,000.<sup>66</sup> The students played a very important role both in the late Qing reforms and the downfall of the regime. Tongmeng Hui, the organization that led the 1911 Revolution, was founded in Japan in

<sup>62</sup> “Japan’s Total Hegemony in East Asia,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 2:9 (1905), 179–81.

<sup>63</sup> Jing Linxiang, ed., *Zhongguo Jiaoyu Zhidu Tongshi* [General History of the Chinese Educational System], vol. 6 (Shandong, 2000) 279–81.

<sup>64</sup> Martin, *Awakening of China*, 194.

<sup>65</sup> Saneto Keishu, *Zhongguo Ren Liuxue Riben Shi* [The History of the Chinese Students in Japan], trans. by Tan Ruqian and Lin Qiyan (Beijing, 1983), 34. On the wave of Chinese students studying in Japan, see also Shu Xincheng, *Jindai Zhongguo Liuxue Shi* [History of Chinese Studying Abroad] (Shanghai, 1927), 46–71; and Jing Linxiang, *Zhongguo Jiaoyu Zhidu Tongshi*, 268–92.

<sup>66</sup> Y. C. Wang, *Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872–1949* (Chapel Hill, 1966), 64. See also Saneto Keishu, *Zhongguo Ren Liuxue Riben Shi*, 35–43. Although the wave of Chinese students going to Japan was speeded up by the Russo-Japanese War, yet another reason was the abolition of *keju*, the civil service examination system in 1905, so that study abroad became a new shortcut to entering the ranks of officialdom.

1905. Of the forty important military officers of the Yunnan Army who first supported that revolution, thirty-one had been students in Japan.<sup>67</sup>

The other fundamental feature of the Japanese model Chinese commentators wanted to adopt involved the strengthening of China's military, both spiritually and materially. A strong army and navy were the preconditions for the construction of a strong nation, and China, it was argued, should learn everything about them from Japan. Special attention was paid to the construction of a decent navy. The war of 1894 had destroyed China's navy, after which foreign powers were able to force the imperial government to grant them railroad and mining rights, control of ports, etc. The Russo-Japanese War again indicated the importance of naval warfare and fired up hopes that China would one day be able to compete in this arena. These views were expressed in *Shi Bao* (The Times), whose lengthy article on the subject was reprinted in *The Eastern Miscellany*. If Japan's navy could essentially be built in ten years and then destroy the Russian fleet, China should learn how to do the same, and issue long-term public bonds and increase taxes to pay for it. For, a "navy is the key to the defense of a nation's rights and independence."<sup>68</sup>

Military spirit or militarism ("*Shang wu zhuyi*") was regarded as an important factor in the Japanese victory and it was important for China to learn this lesson. "When meeting soldiers on the street, the Japanese people salute them to show respect, and when the letter of victory arrives, they gather together to celebrate and praise their soldiers' heroism. That is why an island country can make giant strides in the world and come out on top."<sup>69</sup> China, by contrast, was seen to have suffered so many humiliations in modern times due to the absence of a similar militaristic spirit among the masses.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>67</sup> Wang Xiangrong, *Zhongguo Jindai Hua yu Riben* [Chinese Modernization and Japan] (Changsha, 1987) 50. For their role in modern Chinese history, see Jing Linxiang, *Zhongguo Jiaoyu Zhidu Tongshi*, 287-92; for their role in the reform, see Shang Xiaoming, "Liu Ri Xuesheng yu Qing Mo Gaige" [Chinese Students in Japan and Late Qing Reform], MA thesis, Department of History, Peking University, 1994.

<sup>68</sup> "On the Revival of the Navy," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Junshi (Military), 2:10 (1905), 323-40.

<sup>69</sup> "On the Personality of the Military World," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Junshi, 2:9 (1905), 298-99.

<sup>70</sup> Shen Shu, "On the Cause of the Weakening of the People's Morale in China," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 2:8 (1905), 154-56.

“The people’s character is the element of a nation, the base of a society, the cause of its rise and decline, and the origin of strength and weakness. It is what the nation depends on. If the people’s character is militant, the nation is strong, and thus survives. If the people’s character is not militant, the nation is weak, and thus perishes. Why can Great Britain, France, Germany, and the U.S. be strong? Their strength rests on the militarism of the people’s character. Why did Poland and India perish? Because their peoples were not militant.”<sup>71</sup> In Japan since the Meiji Restoration, engendering a militaristic spirit was the first principle of the educational system, and its people had come to view death in battle as an honor. It thereby succeeded in defeating China and then mighty Russia. If China wanted to become strong, it needed to inculcate the values of militarism. How to do so? “Emphasize the soldiers’ honor, raise the status of soldiers, promote national military training, emphasize that military service is the duty of every citizen, and instill the heroic spirit of bushido, which values death in combat as the highest form of happiness and the courage to die as the highest moral value. In this way, our race can be guarded and the nation protected.”<sup>72</sup> Likewise, shaming the people was seen as an effective means of promoting their bravery and heroism.<sup>73</sup> The desire to inculcate these values was not limited to *The Eastern Miscellany*: in resistance against the Russia’s refusal to withdraw from Manchuria, several Chinese student organizations were set up in Japan. The motto of the “Youth Association” was “nationalism as tenet, destruction as purpose” while that of the “Militant Nationals Educational Association” was “Raise militarism, practice nationalism.”<sup>74</sup>

Although learning from Japan was a strong tendency after the Russo-Japanese War, it is undeniable that the Chinese had mixed feelings about the Japanese, in which admiration mingled with fear, hatred, and condescension. In general China had always looked down on Japan as a small and less civilized country. Although China was badly beaten by Japan in 1894, this mentality continued to exist,

<sup>71</sup> “On Militarism,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 2:5 (1905), 98.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 99.

<sup>73</sup> “On Bravery,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 2:8 (1905), 160.

<sup>74</sup> Jiang Weichiao, “The Memory of China’s Educational Association,” *Xinhai Geming* [The 1911 Revolution], vol. 1, ed. China’s Historical Society, 485–96; Jing Linxiang, *Zhong Guo Jiaoyu Zhidu Tongshi*, 282.

and even after the Russo-Japanese War, some derogatory terms were still used to describe Japan, for example "cuo'er xiao guo" (tiny little country), "dongfang xiao guo"<sup>75</sup> (little Oriental country), or "ququ dao guo"<sup>76</sup> (trivial island country)—and these were even to be found in articles that praised Japan. Japan was China's neighbor and had imitated Chinese culture for centuries—it was hard to get used to the new reality that China would have to imitate Japan.<sup>77</sup> This attitude can be regarded as a survival of the "Middle Kingdom and neighboring barbarians" notion which reflected the long-lasting view of China as *Laoda Digu* (old and big empire).

This Chinese brand of chauvinism was mixed with fear. For a long time an expanding Russia had been the main object of Chinese anxieties, but even before the Sino-Japanese War there was an awareness of a Japanese threat. In a secret report of 1885, Li Hongzhang, one of the most important political figures in modern Chinese history, warned, "in about ten years, Japan's wealth and power will be considerable. She is China's future disaster, despite not being our present anxiety."<sup>78</sup> The prediction came to pass with the 1894 war, at which point some even thought about forming an alliance with Russia to counterbalance Japan. Liu Kunyi, Imperial Commissioner and Governor-General of Liang-Jiang, for instance, submitted a confidential memorandum to this effect.<sup>79</sup> By defeating Russia in 1905, Japan established its hegemony in East Asia and placed China in a subordinate position.<sup>80</sup> China's trepidation about Japanese power

<sup>75</sup> Shi Zhao, "On Colonial Policy," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 2:8 (1905), 175.

<sup>76</sup> "On the Personality of the Military World," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Junshi, 2:9 (1905), 299.

<sup>77</sup> In one article, the author indicated that the Japanese Vice Admiral Togo Heihachiro benefited from Chinese scholar Wang Yangming's philosophy. Li Zhao, "China Has the School For Mending Its Weakness and Reversing Its Decline," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Junshi, 1:4 (1904), 61–63.

<sup>78</sup> See "Li Hongzhang's Secret Report to Zhongli Yamen in 1885," in *China's Response to the West*, ed. Teng and Fairbank, 119–20.

<sup>79</sup> He pointed out, "the impending disaster from other countries is still slow in coming, but that from Japan is imminent. This is because she is close to us; after she has obtained Taiwan and Liaotung, the way for her entrance will be even more convenient, as if her army could start directly from our pillow and mat—it can invade any part of our territory at will." See "Liu Kun-I's Secret Proposal," July 1895, in *ibid.*, 197–98.

<sup>80</sup> Han Fu, "On the Phenomenon of Power in East Asia after the Japanese Victory over Russia," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 2:9 (1905); "Japan's Total Hegemony in East Asia," *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 2:9 (1905). There was a wish that China could share power with Japan since they both were members of the yellow race.

thereafter was accompanied by the hope that if the Chinese nation regained its strength “then we would not have to admire Japan or fear the white race.”<sup>81</sup>

Hatred of Japan was intermingled with these other sentiments, a psychological response to the nation’s humiliation by a supposedly inferior power. Besides defeating China in 1894, Japan imposed a large indemnity of 263 million taels (US\$200 million payable in gold), occupied Chinese territory, and exhibited a thirst for more. Although during the 1904–1905 war the general feeling was pro-Japanese and anti-Russian out of racial solidarity, this changed rapidly after the war as the Japanese exhibited their arrogance and imperiousness. “A great nation [Russia] had been defeated, Japan was exalted and supreme, China was nothing. They [the Japanese] came not as deliverers but as victors, and treated the Chinese with contempt as a conquered people. Then with peace came crowds of the lowest and most undesirable part of the Japanese nation. The Chinese continued to suffer as before.”<sup>82</sup> As the loser, Russia had to accept Japan’s dominance in Korea, transfer to Japan her rights in Lüxhun and the Liaotung Peninsula, and hand over to Japan her railways in southern Manchuria. Japan became a new colonizer and thus a new potential enemy of China.

#### *Afterthoughts*

Simultaneously with this sense of wariness Chinese felt a great deal of admiration for Japan, as this article has conveyed. The combination of abhorrence and veneration, tinged with varying degrees of envy, fear, self-abasement, and adoration, should come as no surprise given our current understanding of the paradoxes of nationalism, one of the more complex phenomena of modern history. All scholars are indebted to the works of those theoreticians of nationalism from various disciplines—most prominently Eric Anderson, John Breuilly, Karl Deutsch, Ernest Gellner, Anthony Giddens, Eric Hobsbawm, Elie Kedourie, Hans Kohn, Boyd C. Shafer, and Anthony

<sup>81</sup> Xian Xian-sheng, “On the Seriousness of China’s Responsibility,” *Dongfang Zazhi*, Sheshuo, 1:1 (1904), 5.

<sup>82</sup> Quoted from Chae-Jin-Lee, *Zhou Enlai: The Early Years* (Stanford, 1994), 27.

Smith—who have so revealingly debated the relationship of nationalism to modernity and identified the dual ethnic and civic conceptions imbedded within nationalist ideologies. For the purposes of this article, however, a somewhat different conceptualization is worth emphasizing. What we see at play in the emotional, ideological, and political-organizational elements of Chinese nationalism in the Russo-Japanese War era are the reactions of a once-glorious empire to foreign aggression, national defeat, and the possibility of salvation offered to it by a neighboring people.

China was at a critical moment in its history when the Russo-Japanese War took place. The danger of possible dismemberment had already given rise to an incipient nationalism that was primarily expressed in the form of xenophobia, as seen in the Boxer Rebellion. After 1904, it took a different, more thoughtful and pragmatic turn, as called for by *The Eastern Miscellany*: Chinese nationalism should “unite organizations, integrate popular forces, and work for the common interest, . . . [and] not burn churches, kill missionaries, or imitate the Boxers.” If the Chinese government were clever enough, it could exploit nationalism as a naturally developed force for social and political cohesion.<sup>83</sup>

Japanese military victories brought about this new phase in the history of Chinese nationalism. Japan’s triumphs were seen as China’s too insofar as they stimulated racial pride and gave the Chinese hope of one day shaking off the humiliations they had endured under white hegemony.<sup>84</sup> As W. A. P. Martin, a former President of the Chinese Imperial University, reported, his Chinese contemporaries felt that “if our neighbor can do this, why may we not do the same? We certainly can if, like them, we break with the effete systems of the past. Let us take these island heroes for our schoolmasters.”<sup>85</sup> In the various ways that we have seen, Chinese intellectuals now viewed the Japanese model as desirable for their own country. Nationalism is usually thought of as a European intellectual import, but in China as elsewhere in Asia and even Africa it is important to note the role

<sup>83</sup> “On the Applicability of the People’s Morale in China,” *Dongfang Zazhi, Sheshuo*, 2:9 (1905), 185.

<sup>84</sup> Bieshi, “On Sino-Japanese Division and Unity,” *Dongfang Zazhi, Sheshuo*, 1:1 (1904), 3.

<sup>85</sup> Martin, *Awakening of China*, 193.

the rising military power of Japan played in stimulating this formative movement within the non-Western world.<sup>86</sup>

To indicate how substantially attitudes had changed among the Chinese as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, we conclude by quoting Sun yat-sen, who in 1905 found that nationalism had become the prevalent ideology among Chinese revolutionaries: "I advocated nationalism before, but [within] . . . the mainstream of the society, few answered the call. [Now, however,] . . . nationalism is spreading rapidly in the society. Nobody considers revolution unnecessary [and] . . . I am welcomed by your gentlemen just because I have promoted nationalism."<sup>87</sup> This potent force in China's modern history was now active.

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<sup>86</sup> See Marks, "Bravo, Brave Tiger of the East," and Paul Rodell, "Inspiration for Nationalist Aspirations? Southeast Asia and Japan's Victory," in *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective*, ed. Steinberg, 629–654.

<sup>87</sup> Sun Zhongshan, "Address at the welcoming meeting of the Chinese students in Tokyo," (August 13, 1905), *Sun Zhongshan Quanjì* [Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen], (Beijing, 1981), Vol. 1, p. 282.